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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

In the Matter of John Wesley Locklair, III, Respondent. 
Appellate Case No. 2016-001754 
Opinion No. 27686 
Submitted November 18, 2016 – Filed December 7, 2016 
DISBARRED 
Lesley M. Coggiola, Disciplinary Counsel, and Julie K. 
Martino, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, both of 
Columbia, for Office of Disciplinary Counsel.  
John Wesley Locklair, II, of Columbia, pro se. 
PER CURIAM: In this attorney disciplinary matter, respondent and the Office 
of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) have entered into an Agreement for Discipline by 
Consent (Agreement) pursuant to Rule 21 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary 
Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court 
Rules (SCACR). In the Agreement, respondent admits misconduct and consents to 
disbarment with conditions as set forth later in this opinion.  He requests that 
disbarment be imposed retroactively to March 6, 2015, the date of his interim
suspension. In the Matter of Locklair, 411 S.C. 627, 769 S.E.2d 675 (2015).  We 
accept the Agreement and disbar respondent from the practice of law in this state 
retroactively to the date of his interim suspension.  The facts, as set forth in the 
Agreement, are as follows. 
Matter I
On May 20, 2013, respondent was appointed to represent Client A who had been 
charged with first degree burglary in May 2011.  A jury trial was held in October 
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2013 and Client A was found guilty and sentenced to life without parole pursuant
to the "three strikes" law. 
On November 8, 2013, respondent filed a Notice of Intent to Appeal in the South 
Carolina Court of Appeals. On November 13, 2013, the Clerk of the Court of 
Appeals notified respondent that his Notice of Appeal was deficient because the 
sentencing sheet was not attached and the lower court case number was incorrect.  
The Clerk gave respondent ten days to correct the errors.  Respondent did not 
respond to the Clerk's letter. 
On March 6, 2014, the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals issued an order 
directing respondent to correct the errors in the Notice of Appeal within ten days or 
appear before the Court of Appeals on March 20, 2014, to explain why he had not 
complied.  Fourteen days later, respondent submitted an Amended Notice of 
Appeal to the Court of Appeals. 
On July 11, 2014, the Chief Appellate Defender of the Division of Appellate 
Defense wrote respondent to notify him that his office would take over 
representation of Client A if respondent desired.  The Chief Appellate Defender 
requested respondent either send him a copy of the order of appointment or notice 
that he planned to continue to pursue the appeal on behalf of Client A.   
On July 20, 2014, Client A filed a complaint with ODC complaining that he did 
not know the status of his appeal and his attempts to communicate with respondent 
had gone unanswered. Respondent did not timely respond to the Notice of 
Investigation sent by ODC on August 4, 2014, or to the reminder letter sent on 
August 28, 2014. On September 30, 2014, ODC sent a subpoena to respondent 
requiring him to appear for an on-the-record interview on October 23, 2014, and to 
provide a copy of Client A's entire file.   
On October 7, 2014, respondent faxed a letter to ODC stating he knew his response 
in the matter was overdue and that he would provide a response the next day.  
However, respondent did not provide a response until October 22, 2014.  In the 
response, he indicated he had twice sent an Affidavit of Indigency to Client A but 
15 

   
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
                                        
 
Client A failed to return it.1  Respondent stated he would visit Client A at the 
Department of Corrections the following week to review the case with him and 
ensure Client A had everything he needed from respondent's file.  Respondent did 
not file a signed verification with his response, he did not appear for the October 
24, 2014, interview, and he did not comply with the subpoena requiring he provide 
Client A's file.   
In the meantime, on August 1, 2014, the Court of Appeals had ordered respondent 
to provide proof within ten days that he had ordered the trial transcript or that he 
had responded to the Chief Appellate Defender's letter.  Respondent did not 
respond to the letter. On December 30, 2014, the Chief Judge of the Court of 
Appeals issued an order relieving respondent from representing Client A in the 
appeal, requesting the Division of Appellate Defense screen Client A's case, and 
directing the Clerk of Court to forward the order to ODC.  The order cited several 
Rules of Professional Conduct. 
On March 2, 2015, respondent emailed ODC and stated he had been involuntarily 
committed for substance abuse issues.  Upon petition by ODC, the Court issued an 
order placing respondent on interim suspension and transferring him to incapacity 
inactive status on March 6, 2015. Id.
Respondent was released from the rehabilitation facility on March 9, 2015.  On 
March 12, 2015, respondent telephoned ODC to state he would soon be responding 
to its request for information. 
On April 17, 2015, ODC issued a subpoena to respondent for financial records.  To 
date, respondent has not complied with this subpoena.   
On September 25, 2015, respondent voluntarily submitted to an on-the-record 
interview with ODC. During the interview, respondent indicated he did not 
respond to the Chief Appellate Defender's letter because, at the time, he had a 
serious cocaine addiction and was suffering from severe depression and bi-polar 
disorder. Respondent stated he was diagnosed with these problems during his 
1 The Chief Appellate Defender's letter stated respondent need only submit the 
completed Affidavit of Indigency on behalf of Client A if respondent had been 
retained. As noted above, respondent was appointed. 
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rehabilitation stay in March 2015.  He admitted he had had a serious drug problem 
for several years.2 
Respondent admits that, by his conduct in connection with his representation of 
Client A, he violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR: Rule 1.3 (lawyer shall act with reasonableness and 
diligence in representing a client); Rule 1.4 (lawyer shall keep client reasonably 
informed about status of matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for 
information); Rule 3.2 (lawyer shall make efforts to expedite litigation consistent 
with interests of client); and Rule 8.4(e) (it is professional misconduct for lawyer 
to engage in conduct prejudicial to administration of justice).
Matter II 
Respondent represented Client B in an automobile accident case.  Client B sought 
treatment from Dr. Rodney Arnold, a chiropractor.  On January 23, 2013, 
respondent sent Dr. Arnold a letter of protection stating he would make direct 
payment to Dr. Arnold from the proceeds received from settlement.   
On August 6, 2014, Client B told Dr. Arnold that his case had settled eight months 
earlier and he thought his medical bills had been paid by respondent.  After several
unsuccessful attempts were made to contact respondent, Dr. Arnold filed a 
complaint with ODC on August 29, 2014.
Respondent did not timely respond to the Notice of Investigation sent by ODC on 
September 3, 2014.  On September 30, 2014, ODC sent a subpoena to respondent 
requiring him to appear for an on-the-record interview on October 23, 2014, and to 
provide a copy of the client file.  On October 7, 2014, respondent faxed a letter to 
ODC stating he knew his response was overdue and that he would provide a 
response the next day. Respondent did not provide a response until October 22, 
2014, but failed to include a signed verification.  He did not appear for the 
scheduled interview. On December 9, 2014, respondent faxed Client B's file to 
ODC. 
2 According to the Agreement, respondent is not currently in any treatment or 
counseling program.  
17 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In his response, Respondent admitted he failed to protect Dr. Arnold's interests.  
He stated the settlement funds went directly to his client and not through his trust 
account. Respondent requested sixty days in which to reimburse Dr. Arnold.    
At an interview in September 2015, respondent admitted misconduct in this matter.  
With regard to the settlement funds, respondent clarified that he deposited the 
money from the settlement into his trust account then used the funds to buy 
cocaine. He explained he had another case that he believed would settle for a 
significant amount of money and he intended to reimburse the Client B ledger 
when that happened. Respondent stated that Client B received the proceeds from
the settlement, but that he failed to pay Dr. Arnold.   
Respondent admits that, by his conduct in connection with his representation of 
Client B, he violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR: Rule 1.3 (lawyer shall act with reasonableness and 
diligence in representing a client); Rule 1.15 (lawyer shall hold property of third 
person that is in lawyer's possession in connection with a representation separate 
from lawyer's own property; lawyer shall promptly deliver to third person any 
funds third person entitled to receive); Rule 4.4 (in representing client, lawyer shall 
not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to burden third person); 
and Rule 8.4(e) (it is professional misconduct for lawyer to engage in conduct 
prejudicial to administration of justice). 
Matter III
Respondent represented Client C in a breach of contract action against a defendant.  
On April 18, 2013, the special referee signed an order granting judgment in favor 
of Client C for $17,500 plus costs and attorney's fees.  The order was filed in the 
Horry County Clerk of Court's Office on May 14, 2013.    
On February 4, 2014, respondent called Client C's president to relay an offer from
the defendant to settle the judgment for $15,000 to be paid within three weeks.  
The president agreed to the offer. 
On February 14, 2014, a Satisfaction of Judgment signed by respondent was filed 
in Horry County. The satisfaction indicated the judgment had been paid.  Client 
C's president was not informed of the filing of the Satisfaction of Judgment and he 
did not receive the settlement funds.  
18 

  
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
Several times during March of 2014, Client C's president called and emailed 
respondent asking if the defendant had paid the settlement.  On March 19, 2014, 
respondent told the president he would have the money by the following week.  
In May 2014 and for the next six months, Client C's president attempted to reach 
respondent to inquire about the payment.  Respondent refused to communicate 
with Client C's president.   
In February 2015, Client C hired another attorney ("New Attorney") to assist with 
the collection of the judgment from the defendant.  New Attorney discovered that 
the judgment was marked satisfied and had been signed by respondent.  On 
February 12, 2015, New Attorney left a voicemail for respondent inquiring about 
the judgment. New Attorney also contacted the defendant's attorney to find out 
what he knew about the judgment. 
Respondent did not return New Attorney's telephone call, but sent an email to 
Client C's president on February 13, 2015.  He apologized for the delay and stated 
he now had the matter resolved and would get the money to him within ten to 
fourteen days. 
On February 16, 2015, the defendant's attorney informed New Attorney that the 
defendant had paid the judgment in February 2014.  The defendant's attorney 
forwarded a copy of the cashier's check to New Attorney.  The copy showed the 
check was issued by a bank on February 7, 2014, on behalf of the defendant to 
"[respondent] attorney for [Client C]."  The defendant's attorney also told New 
Attorney that respondent had personally picked up the check and signed for it on 
February 14, 2014. 
New Attorney informed Client C's president.  Client C's president was shocked to 
learn that respondent had received payment of $15,000 and that the judgment had 
been satisfied. Respondent did not remit payment to Client C.  On February 20, 
2015, New Attorney filed a complaint with ODC.    
Respondent did not respond to the Notice of Investigation, Notice to Appear, and
Subpoena for Client's C's file and trust account records sent by ODC on February 
20, 2015. At the September 25, 2015, interview, respondent admitted the conduct 
described above and stated he retained the money in his trust account and, over 
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time, removed the funds to purchase drugs. He further admitted he signed the 
Satisfaction of Judgment and misappropriated the settlement funds.    
Respondent admits that, by his conduct in connection with his representation of 
Client C, he violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR: Rule 1.4 (lawyer shall keep client reasonably 
informed about status of matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for 
information); Rule 1.15 (lawyer shall hold property of client in lawyer's possession 
in connection with a representation separate from lawyer's own property; upon 
receiving funds which client has an interest, lawyer shall promptly notify client and
shall promptly deliver to client any funds client entitled to receive); Rule 3.3 
(lawyer shall not knowingly make false statement of fact to tribunal); Rule 8.4(b) 
(it is professional misconduct for lawyer to commit criminal act that reflects 
adversely on lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as lawyer in other 
respects); Rule 8.4(c) (it is professional misconduct for lawyer to commit criminal
act involving moral turpitude); Rule 8.4(d) (it is professional misconduct for 
lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation); and Rule 8.4(e) (it is professional misconduct for lawyer to 
engage in conduct prejudicial to administration of justice). 
Matter IV
On December 1, 2014, Client D retained respondent to represent her on a DUI 
charge. Client D made three payments of $200 each to respondent.  When
respondent was suspended on March 6, 2015, he had not completed any work for 
Client D; he did not refund any money to her.   
Respondent did not respond to the Notice of Investigation dated August 6, 2015, or 
to a reminder letter from ODC sent on August 31, 2015.  During the September 25, 
2015, interview, respondent stated he started work on Client D's file but was 
suspended and did not contact Client D. 
Respondent admits that, by his conduct in connection with his representation of 
Client D, he violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR: Rule 1.3 (lawyer shall act with reasonableness and 
diligence in representing a client); Rule 1.16 (upon termination of representation, 
lawyer shall refund fee that has not been earned); and Rule 8.4(e) (it is professional 
misconduct for lawyer to engage in conduct prejudicial to administration of justice) 
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Matter V
	
Client E retained respondent for representation on drug charges stemming from his 
arrest on December 19, 2014.  On January 3, 2015, the mother of Client E's
children paid respondent $1,000 for the representation.  She made two more 
payments of $500 each, one on January 20, 2015, and the second on February 6, 
2015, for a total of $2,000. 
Respondent visited Client E in the detention center on one occasion.  He did not 
file any discovery motions and did not conduct an investigation on Client E's
behalf. Respondent did not file a notice of appearance on behalf of Client E.  
When he was initially booked into the detention center, Client E filed an Affidavit 
of Indigency.  On February 17, 2015, a local contract public defender was 
appointed to represent Client E.  The public defender filed discovery motions the 
same day. 
Client E did not tell the public defender that he had hired and paid respondent.  The
public defender did not know another attorney represented respondent.  She had no 
communication with respondent. The public defender negotiated a favorable plea 
deal for Client E and he pled guilty on August 14, 2015.  
Client E filed a complaint with ODC on December 14, 2015, alleging respondent 
did not do the work he was hired to do and did not earn the fee paid to him.  
Respondent did not respond to the Notice of Investigation sent on December 23, 
2015. 
Respondent admits that, by his conduct in connection with his representation of 
Client E, he violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR: Rule 1.3 (lawyer shall act with reasonableness and 
diligence in representing a client); Rule 1.4 (lawyer shall keep client reasonably 
informed about status of matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for 
information); Rule 3.2 (lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation 
consistent with interests of client); and Rule 8.4(e) (it is professional misconduct 
for lawyer to engage in conduct prejudicial to administration of justice) 
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Respondent further agrees that, in connection with all of the matters discussed 
above, his communication and cooperation with ODC has been sporadic since the 
first disciplinary matter was opened in July 2014.  Respondent admits his failure to 
cooperate violates the following provision of the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
Rule 407, SCACR: Rule 8.1(b) (in connection with disciplinary matter, lawyer 
shall not knowingly fail to respond to lawful demand for information from 
disciplinary authority). 
Additional Matters
During his September 25, 2015, interview, respondent admitted to three additional 
matters of misconduct that were not the subject of disciplinary complaints.  It is 
believed that the three clients discussed below are unaware of respondent's
handling of their settlement proceeds. 
Respondent represented Client F in an automobile accident case.  Respondent 
agreed to pay the physical therapist's bill from the settlement proceeds.  The case 
settled and respondent disbursed Client F's portion of the proceeds to Client F but 
failed to pay Indigo Therapy Specialists for Client F's treatment.  The bill totals 
$3,133.92. 
Respondent admits he used the money from Client F's settlement proceeds to 
purchase drugs. He further admits he did not maintain an adequate client file and 
did not maintain financial records as required by Rule 417, SCACR.   
Respondent represented Client G in an automobile accident case.  Client G 
received a litigation loan from Covered Bridge Capital, LLC, as an advance on her 
proceeds. Respondent admitted he was obligated to reimburse the loan from the 
settlement proceeds, but he did not reimburse the loan company as he used the 
money to purchase drugs.
Respondent also admits he failed to maintain an adequate file, thus, no 
disbursement sheet is available and the details of the loan are unknown.  In 
addition, respondent failed to maintain trust account records in this matter as 
required by Rule 417, SCACR. 
Respondent represented Client H in an automobile accident case.  After the case 
settled, Client H received her proceeds and respondent maintained $5,000 in his 
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trust account to negotiate and pay Client H's medical bills.  Respondent used the 
money to buy drugs and did not pay the medical bills.  Further, respondent failed to 
maintain trust account records for this matter as required by Rule 417, SCACR.   
Client H's file, provided to ODC by the Receiver, contains a list of medical 
providers and amounts owed.  Respondent failed to pay providers a total of 
$4,605.49. 
Respondent admits that, by his conduct in connection with the representation of 
Client F, Client G, and Client H, he violated the following Rules of Professional 
Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR: Rule 1.3 (lawyer shall act with reasonableness and 
diligence in representing client); Rule 1.4 (lawyer shall keep client reasonably 
informed about status of matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for 
information); Rule 1.15 (lawyer shall hold property of third persons in lawyer's
possession in connection with a representation separate from lawyer's own 
property; upon receiving funds which third person has an interest, lawyer shall 
promptly notify third person and promptly deliver to third person any funds third 
person entitled to receive); Rule 4.4 (in representing client, lawyer shall not use 
means that have no substantial purpose other than to burden third person); Rule 
8.4(b) (it is professional misconduct for lawyer to commit criminal act that reflects 
adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other 
respects); Rule 8.4(d) (it is professional misconduct for lawyer to engage in 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation); and Rule 8.4(e) 
(it is professional misconduct for lawyer to engage in conduct prejudicial to 
administration of justice). In addition, respondent admits he violated the 
recordkeeping provisions of Rule 417, SCACR.   
Finally, in addition to his admitted violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
specifically referenced in each matter discussed above, respondent agrees that his 
misconduct constitutes grounds for discipline pursuant to the following provisions 
of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule 413, SCACR:  Rule 
7(a)(1) (it shall be ground for discipline for lawyer to violate Rules of Professional 
Conduct); Rule 7(a)(3) (it shall be ground for discipline for lawyer to knowingly 
fail to respond to lawyer demand from disciplinary counsel); Rule 7(a)(5) (it shall 
be ground for discipline for lawyer to engage in conduct tending to pollute 
administration of justice or to bring courts or legal professions into disrepute and 
demonstrating unfitness to practice law); Rule 7(a)(6) (it shall be ground for 
discipline for lawyer to violate Oath of Office taken upon admission to practice 
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 law in South Carolina); and Rule 7(a)(7) (it shall be ground for discipline for 
lawyer to willfully violate valid court order).   
 
Conclusion 
 
We accept the Agreement for Discipline by Consent and disbar respondent from 
the practice of law in this state, retroactively to March 6, 2015, the date of his 
interim suspension.  Id.  Within thirty (30) days of the date of this opinion, 
respondent shall enter into a payment plan with the Commission on Lawyer 
Conduct (the Commission) to pay the costs incurred in the investigation and 
prosecution of this matter by ODC and the Commission.  Further, within thirty (30) 
days of the date of this opinion, respondent shall enter into a payment plan to pay 
restitution as follows: 
 
1. 	  $2,736.00 to Dr. Rodney Arnold; 
2. 	  $15,000.00 to the President of Client C; 
3. 	  $600.00 to Client D; 
4. 	  $2,000 to the individual who paid fees on behalf of Client E;  
5. 	  $3,133.92 to Indigo Therapy Specialists;  
6. 	  $2,519.59 to Covered Bridge Capital, LLC; 
7. 	  a total of $4,605.49 to medical providers on behalf of Client H as 
specified in Exhibit 1 to the Addendum to Agreement; and 
 
8. respondent shall fully reimburse the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection 
for any and all amounts paid on his behalf.   
 
Within fifteen (15) days of the date of this opinion, respondent shall file an 
affidavit with the Clerk of Court showing that he has complied with Rule 30 of 
Rule 413, SCACR, and shall also surrender his Certificate of Admission to the 
Practice of Law to the Clerk of Court. 
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DISBARRED. 
PLEICONES, C.J., BEATTY, KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ., concur.  FEW, 
J., not participating. 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

Maurice C. Kinard, Petitioner, 
v. 
State of South Carolina, Respondent. 
Appellate Case No. 2015-001205 
Appeal From Richland County 

The Honorable Diane S. Goodstein, Circuit Court Judge 

The Honorable Brooks P. Goldsmith, Post-Conviction 

Judge
	
Opinion No. 27687 

Submitted November 14, 2016 – Filed December 7, 2016 

AFFIRMED 
Appellate Defender Kathrine Haggard Hudgins, of the 
South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense, 
Division of Appellate Defense, of Columbia, for 
Petitioner. 
Attorney General Alan M. Wilson and Assistant Attorney 
General Jessica Elizabeth Kinard, both of Columbia, for 
Respondent. 
PER CURIAM:  Petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari to review the denial of his 
application for post-conviction relief (PCR).  We grant the petition for a writ of 
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certiorari, dispense with further briefing, and proceed with a review of the direct 
appeal issue pursuant to Davis v. State, 288 S.C. 290, 342 S.E.2d 60 (1986).
Petitioner contends the PCR judge erred in finding plea counsel was not ineffective 
in failing to file a notice of appeal on petitioner's behalf.  We agree. 
Petitioner testified at the PCR hearing that he asked plea counsel, promptly after 
sentencing, to file a notice of appeal.  Plea counsel testified he could not recall if 
petitioner made such a request at the conclusion of the plea proceeding, but 
counsel acknowledged he received a letter from petitioner after the time to appeal 
had expired. Counsel testified he did not see a reason to appeal. 
The PCR judge found plea counsel believed an appeal would be frivolous and 
"credibly emphasized" that he and petitioner "worked hard for the plea deal and 
received what [c]ounsel testified [w]as a near best case scenario in being able to 
plead to voluntary manslaughter."  The PCR judge found petitioner was advised by 
the plea judge that if he wished to appeal, he would have ten days to do so.  
Finally, the PCR judge found petitioner failed to present any evidence showing he 
may be prejudiced by the alleged deficiency, as there were no objections made at
the guilty plea proceeding and plea counsel had no reason to file a notice of appeal. 
We find the PCR judge applied the wrong standard in evaluating petitioner's 
allegation that plea counsel was ineffective in failing to file a notice of appeal after
petitioner requested he do so.  The merits of any such appeal, while relevant to an 
allegation that counsel failed to advise a defendant of the right to appeal, are not 
relevant where a PCR applicant alleges counsel failed to file an appeal after being 
asked to do so. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 
985 (2000). A lawyer who disregards specific instructions from the defendant to 
file a notice of appeal acts in a manner that is professionally unreasonable 
regardless of whether the appeal would have had merit.  Id., at 477. "[W]hen 
counsel's constitutionally deficient performance deprives a defendant of an appeal 
that he otherwise would have taken, the defendant has made out a successful 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim entitling him to an appeal."  Id., at 484. The 
defendant need not show that his hypothetical appeal might have had merit, only 
that but for counsel's deficient conduct, the defendant would have appealed.  Id., at 
486. 
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Because the PCR judge failed to apply the proper standard in evaluating 
petitioner's claim, and instead evaluated the claim on the improper basis of whether 
the appeal would have been successful, we reverse the finding that plea counsel 
was not ineffective in failing to file a notice of appeal and proceed with a review of 
petitioner's direct appeal issue.  See Hiott v. State, 381 S.C. 622, 674 S.E.2d 491 
(2009)(The decision of the PCR judge may be reversed when it is controlled by an 
error of law.). 
Petitioner's conviction and sentence are affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(B)(1), 
SCACR, and the following authorities: Rule 203(d)(1)(B)(iv), SCACR (If the 
appeal is from a guilty plea, the appellant must file a written explanation showing 
that there is an issue which can be reviewed on appeal.  The explanation should 
identify the issue(s) to be raised on appeal and the factual basis for the issue(s) 
including how the issue(s) was raised below and the ruling of the lower court on 
that issue(s). If an issue was not raised to and ruled on by the lower court, the 
explanation must include argument and citation to legal authority showing how the 
issue can be reviewed on appeal.  If the appellant fails to make a sufficient 
showing, the notice of appeal may be dismissed.); State v. Johnston, 333 S.C. 459, 
462 510 S.E.2d 423, 425 (1999)("[T]his Court has consistently held that a 
challenge to sentencing must be raised at trial, or the issue will not be preserved for 
appellate review."). 
AFFIRMED. 
PLEICONES, C.J., BEATTY, KITTREDGE, HEARN and FEW, JJ., concur.
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

In the Matter of David Paul Reuwer, Respondent. 
Appellate Case No. 2016-001495 
Opinion No. 27688 
Submitted November 16, 2016 – Filed December 7, 2016 
PUBLIC REPRIMAND 
Lesley M. Coggiola, Disciplinary Counsel, and Kelly B. 
Arnold, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, both of 
Columbia, for Office of Disciplinary Counsel. 
David Paul Reuwer,  of Camden, Pro Se. 
PER CURIAM: In this attorney disciplinary matter, respondent and the Office 
of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) have entered into an Agreement for Discipline by 
Consent (Agreement) pursuant to Rule 21 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary 
Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court 
Rules (SCACR). In the Agreement, respondent admits misconduct and consents to 
the issuance of a confidential admonition or a public reprimand.  As a condition of 
discipline, respondent agrees to complete the Legal Ethics and Practice Program
Ethics School, Trust Account School, and Law Office Management School within 
nine months of imposition of a sanction.  Respondent also agrees to submit his 
monthly bank statement, reconciliation report, and trial balance report for his trust 
account for a period of one year following the imposition of a sanction.  We accept 
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the Agreement, subject to the aforementioned conditions, and issue a public 
reprimand.1  The facts, as set forth in the Agreement, are as follows. 
Facts 
Matter A 
Respondent provided legal services to Client A with regards to obtaining a name 
change for the client's minor child.  Client A paid respondent a non-refundable 
retainer fee of $500 pursuant to a fee agreement that indicated "name change" as 
the legal service respondent would be providing.  Respondent did not provide any 
further written explanation as to the specific legal services he would or would not 
be providing in connection with the name change.  Client A believed the services 
provided would include obtaining an amended birth certificate for the minor child. 
Respondent represents that he orally explained to Client A that legal services 
provided in connection with the name change did not include obtaining the 
amended birth certificate but that he would assist Client A in doing so.  
Respondent has no documentation regarding his conversation with Client A. 
Despite respondent's unsuccessful attempts to resolve the matter by agreement with
the opposing party, respondent did not request a final hearing until five months 
after the attempts at an agreement failed.  According to Client A, respondent failed 
to notify her of the final hearing date until the day before the hearing.  Respondent 
1 Respondent has a disciplinary history that consists of a letter of caution with a finding of minor 
misconduct, issued in 2005, which cites Rule 8.4(e) of the Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC), 
Rule 407, SCACR (it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice); a letter of caution with no finding of misconduct, 
issued in 2010, which cites Rule 1.4, RPC (a lawyer shall reasonably consult with the client, 
keep the client reasonably informed and promptly comply with reasonable requests for 
information); a letter of caution with no finding of misconduct, issued in 2010, citing Rule 1.3, 
RPC (a lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client) and 
Rule 1.4, supra; a letter of caution with a finding of minor misconduct, issued in 2010, citing 
Rule 8.4, RPC (setting forth what constitutes professional misconduct); and a letter of caution 
with no finding of misconduct, issued in 2010, citing Rule 1.3, supra, Rule 1.4, supra, and Rule 
3.2, RPC (a lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the 
interests of the client). See Rule 2(r), RLDE (the fact that a letter of caution has been issued may 
be considered in a subsequent disciplinary proceeding against the lawyer if the caution or 
warning contained in the letter of caution is relevant to the misconduct alleged in the 
proceedings). 
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represents Client A was given notice of the hearing earlier, but he has no 
documentation of the prior notice.  Respondent also failed to serve the opposing 
party with notice of the hearing.  The hearing was re-scheduled, after which Client 
A paid respondent an additional $501.30 for the filing fee, court costs, and 
guardian ad litem fees. 
Documentation respondent subsequently submitted to the Department of Vital 
Records at the Department of Health and Environmental Control was not complete 
and respondent failed to satisfy requests for additional information.  Respondent 
represents he communicated with the Department of Vital Records by telephone 
several times, but he has no documentation regarding those communications.  
While initially respondent assisted and advised Client A in obtaining the amended 
birth certificate, he later decided to require additional payment from Client A for 
those legal services; however, he failed to inform Client A of his decision in a 
timely manner. 
At times, respondent failed to respond to Client A's reasonable requests for 
information about the status of the matter, including the status of the amended birth 
certificate. When Client A's attempts to contact respondent by telephone and email 
were unsuccessful, she went to respondent's office without an appointment.  
Respondent represents he informed Client A she would have to pay for his 
assistance in obtaining the amended birth certificate.  Respondent stopped 
communicating with Client A regarding the amended birth certificate when she 
refused to further compensate respondent.
Respondent also represented Client A in a child custody action.  Client A paid 
respondent a non-refundable retainer fee of $500 pursuant to an agreement that 
indicated "child custody" was the legal service being provided. Respondent did 
not provide any further written explanation as to the specific legal services he 
would or would not be providing with regard to the action.  Respondent represents 
he agreed to appear with Client A on her pro se child custody contempt action 
against the father of her minor son, but respondent has no documentation related to 
his specific legal services. 
During a hearing in the action, respondent repeatedly stated he would prepare a 
proposed order, circulate the order among the parties, and then forward it to the 
judge for review and signature.  Respondent represents he was negotiating a co-
parenting agreement with the child's father on Client A's behalf and intended the 
order to also reflect the parties' agreement; however, when the parties failed to 
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reach an agreement, respondent failed to prepare the proposed order, and to date, 
over two and a half years after the hearing, has not prepared a proposed order.  
At times, respondent failed to respond to Client A's reasonable requests for 
information about the status of the child custody case, including inquiries about the 
missing court order.  Respondent eventually decided to terminate his representation 
of Client A, but failed to inform her of his decision in a timely manner and stopped 
communicating with her about the case. 
Matter B 
Respondent represented Client B in her capacity as personal representative of her 
deceased brother's estate.  Client B paid respondent a non-refundable retainer fee 
of $1,500 pursuant to a fee agreement that indicated "probate of dec. brother" was
the legal service being provided by respondent.  Client B believed this included 
representing the estate. Respondent did not provide any further written 
explanation as to the specific legal services he would or would not be providing to 
Client B. Respondent represents he orally communicated to Client B that he was 
only representing her as the personal representative and not the estate; however, 
respondent has no documentation of those communications. 
Respondent deposited the fee directly into his operating account even though he 
had not yet fully provided the service associated with the fee.  Because respondent 
did not have a written advance fee agreement containing all of the language 
required by Rule 1.5(f), RPC, and received the fee in advance of performing the 
work, respondent violated Rule 1.15, RPC, by failing to deposit the unearned fee 
into his trust account. Client B paid additional fees, as requested by respondent.2 
At times, respondent failed to respond to Client B's reasonable requests for 
information about the status of the case and failed to timely file required 
documents with the probate court, which led Client B to release respondent from
his representation. Respondent failed to provide Client B with her file despite 
verbal and written requests. 
2 In response to a subpoena for all records required by Rule 417, SCACR, respondent provided 
copies of some of Client B's checks but did not document Client B's billing and therefore did not 
have any copies of bills for legal fees or expenses to provide during the investigation.  
Respondent also did not maintain copies of records of deposit or cancelled checks in this matter 
and therefore did not have them to provide during the disciplinary investigation. 
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Client B's new counsel requested the file by letter and by telephone, and 
arrangements were made to drop the file off at new counsel's office; however, 
respondent informed new counsel he needed to make copies of the file in light of 
Client B's complaint in this disciplinary matter and that he would not be returning 
the file as previously scheduled.  Over the next month, Client B's new counsel 
attempted by certified letters and voice mail messages to re-schedule a time to 
retrieve the file, but respondent did not respond to the letters or the messages.  
Respondent eventually called Client B's new counsel and stated he had to provide 
the file to ODC for an upcoming hearing.  Thereafter, Client B's new counsel sent a 
staff member to respondent's office to retrieve the file without success.  
Respondent represents he told the staff member she could return the next day to 
pick up the file, and the file was in fact retrieved at that time.  Upon review of the 
file, ODC discovered original documents relevant to the probate matter and to 
Client B personally. 
Respondent also represented Client B as a closing attorney in a residential real 
estate purchase transaction. In response to a subpoena issued by ODC for all 
records required by Rule 417, SCACR, respondent provided the HUD-1 settlement 
statement and copies of disbursement checks regarding the closing but did not 
maintain reconciliation reports and therefore did not have them to provide during 
this investigation. Respondent did not reconcile his trust account in the manner 
required by Rule 417, SCACR, and particularly as described in Comment 5 to Rule 
1 of that rule.3 
A notice of investigation was mailed to respondent; however, he failed to respond 
to the complaint. Respondent did submit a written response after receipt of a 
Treacy letter.4 
3 Comment 5 states: "The potential for these records to serve as safeguards is realized only if the 
procedures set forth in Rule 1(i) are regularly performed.  The trial balance is the sum of 
balances of each client's ledger card (or the electronic equivalent). Its value lies in comparing it 
on a monthly basis to a control balance.  The control balance starts with the previous month's 
balance, then adds receipts from the Trust Receipts Journal and subtracts disbursements from the 
Trust Disbursements Journal.  Once the total matches the trial balance, the reconciliation readily 
follows by adding amounts of any outstanding checks and subtracting any deposits not credited 
by the bank at month's end.  This balance should agree with the bank statement.  Monthly 
reconciliation is required by this rule." 
4 In the Matter of Treacy, 277 S.C. 514, 290 S.E.2d 240 (1982). 
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Law 

Respondent admits his conduct in these matters violates the following Rules of 
Professional Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR: Rule 1.2(a)(a lawyer shall abide by a 
client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation and consult with the 
client as to the means by which they are to be pursued); Rule 1.3, supra; Rule 1.4, 
supra; Rule 1.5(f)(requirements for advance fees); Rule 1.15(a)(a lawyer shall hold 
property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer's possession in connection 
with a representation separate from the lawyer's own property; complete records of 
such account funds and other property shall be kept by the lawyer and preserved 
for a period of six years after termination of the representation; a lawyer shall 
comply with Rule 417, SCACR); Rule 1.15(c)(a lawyer shall deposit into a client 
trust account unearned legal fees and expenses that have been paid in advance, to 
be withdrawn by the lawyer only as fees are earned or expenses incurred, unless 
the lawyer and the client have entered into a written agreement concerning the 
handling of fees paid in advance pursuant to Rule 1.5(f)); Rule 1.15(d)(upon 
receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an interest, a 
lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person, shall promptly deliver to the 
client or third person any funds or other property that the client or third person is 
entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall promptly 
render a full accounting regarding such property); Rule 1.16(d) (upon termination 
of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to 
protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing 
time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which 
the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fees or expenses that 
have not been earned or incurred; the lawyer may retain papers relating to the 
client to the extent permitted by other law and may retain a reasonable 
nonrefundable retainer); Rule 3.2, supra; Rule 8.1(b)(a lawyer in connection with a 
disciplinary matter shall not knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for 
information from a disciplinary authority); and Rule 8.4(e), supra.
Respondent also admits his conduct constitutes grounds for discipline under Rule 
7(a)(1), RLDE (it shall be a ground for discipline for a lawyer to violate the Rules
of Professional Conduct or any other rules of this jurisdiction regarding 
professional conduct of lawyers). 
34 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 

We find respondent's misconduct warrants a public reprimand.  Accordingly, we 
accept the Agreement and publicly reprimand respondent for his misconduct.  
Respondent shall complete the Legal Ethics and Practice Program Ethics School, 
Trust Account School, and Law Office Management School within nine months of 
the date of this opinion.  Respondent shall also submit his monthly bank statement, 
reconciliation report, and trial balance report for his trust account to ODC for a 
period of one year from the date of this opinion.   
PUBLIC REPRIMAND. 
PLEICONES, C.J., BEATTY, KITTREDGE, HEARN and FEW, JJ., concur.
35 

  
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
   
  
   
    
   
 
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

In the Matter of John Kevin Owens, Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2016-001741 
Opinion No. 27689 
Submitted November 16, 2016 – Filed December 7, 2016 
DISBARRED 
Lesley M. Coggiola, Disciplinary Counsel, and Ericka M. 
Williams, Senior Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, both of 
Columbia, for Office of Disciplinary Counsel. 
Robert Clyde Childs, III, Childs Law Firm, of Greenville, 
for Respondent. 
PER CURIAM: In this attorney disciplinary matter, respondent and the Office 
of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) have entered into an Agreement for Discipline by
Consent (Agreement) pursuant to Rule 21 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary 
Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court 
Rules (SCACR). In the Agreement, respondent admits misconduct and consents to 
disbarment with conditions. He requests the disbarment be imposed retroactively
to March 5, 2014, the date of his interim suspension. In the Matter of Owens, 407 
S.C. 225, 755 S.E.2d 113 (2014). We accept the Agreement and disbar respondent
from the practice of law in this state, retroactive to the date of his interim
suspension. In addition, we impose the conditions set forth in this opinion. The 
facts, as set forth in the Agreement, are as follows. 
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Matter A
	
Respondent was retained on February 26, 2013, to represent Client A in a domestic 
matter. Respondent was paid $1,000 for his representation. On March 6, 2013, 
Respondent sent a letter to Client A indicating he was enclosing a copy of the 
complaint he had forwarded to the family court for filing. Respondent stated he 
would serve the opposing party as soon as he received the filed copy back from the
family court. In fact, Respondent never filed the complaint with the family court.
Client A eventually terminated the representation and requested a refund of  his  
unused retainer.  Respondent did not return the unearned portion of the fee.   
ODC mailed a Notice of Investigation to Respondent on June 10, 2013, requesting 
a response within fifteen (15) days. When no response was received, Respondent
was served with a letter pursuant to In the Matter of Treacy, 277 S.C. 514, 290 
S.E.2d 240 (1982), again requesting Respondent's response. Respondent 
responded on October 22, 2013, when he appeared for an on-the-record interview 
pursuant to Rule 19(b), RLDE. 
Matter B 
On February 19, 2013, Respondent was retained to represent Client B in  a
domestic matter. Client B paid Respondent $1,400 for the representation. Because
Client B was out of the country, Respondent was directed to communicate with
Client B's mother.   
On March 13, 2013, Respondent sent an email to Client B's mother which read, 
"Attached is the copy of the complaint I have filed with the Family Court in [Client 
B's] divorce proceeding. I should reeve (sic) the cocked (sic) copy back in several 
days and will begin the process of serving it through publication  in a local  
newspaper obviously without any identifying information." At the time, 
Respondent had not filed any documents with the family court on Client B's behalf, 
and in fact, Respondent never filed the referenced complaint.  
On May 22, 2013, this Court placed Respondent on administrative suspension for 
failure to comply with continuing legal education (CLE) requirements. Lawyer did 
not inform Client B or her mother of his administrative suspension.   
Client B terminated Respondent's representation on June 3, 2013, and requested a
refund of the entire amount paid to Respondent. Respondent failed to timely 
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refund the unearned portion of his fee. ODC mailed a Notice of Investigation to 
Respondent on June 17, 2013, requesting a response within fifteen (15) days.
Respondent's written response was hand delivered on October 22, 2013, when 
Respondent appeared for an interview with ODC.   
Matter C 
Pursuant to Rule 416, SCACR, the South Carolina Bar Resolution of Fee Disputes 
Board (RFDB) ordered Respondent to pay Client B the amount of $1,400. After
Respondent failed to pay Client B, a certificate of non-compliance was issued by 
RFDB. ODC mailed a Notice of Investigation to Respondent on October 7, 2013, 
requesting a response within fifteen (15) days. Respondent's written response was
received by Disciplinary Counsel on July 14, 2014.   
Matter D 
Respondent submitted a letter to South Carolina Farm Bureau Insurance (Farm
Bureau) asserting his representation of Client C in connection with a claim arising 
from an automobile accident. After agreeing to settle the claim, Farm Bureau
issued two checks to Respondent made payable to Respondent for Client C.  Farm
Bureau issued a written request to Respondent to hold the drafts in trust and not
disburse any funds until a release was fully executed and returned to the claims 
adjuster. Respondent negotiated the checks. Despite numerous requests and 
reminders, Respondent failed to deliver the release to Farm Bureau. Further, 
Respondent failed to disburse any proceeds of the settlement to Client C.   
Respondent failed to safeguard Client C's settlement and converted the funds for 
Respondent's personal use. ODC mailed a Notice of Investigation to Respondent 
on December 30, 2013, requesting a response within fifteen (15) days.  On January
8, 2014, Disciplinary Counsel issued a Notice to Appear requesting Respondent's
appearance on February 6, 2014, for an interview. Prior to his scheduled 
appearance, Respondent retained counsel, and the appearance was continued at the 
request of counsel. Respondent's written response was received on July 14, 2014.   
Matter E 
While administratively suspended, Respondent agreed to represent Client D in a 
civil matter concerning Client D's business. Respondent accepted payment from 
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Client D but did not do any work on Client D's behalf.  Due to Respondent's failure 
to do any work on the matter, a default judgment was entered against Client D's 
company.   
ODC mailed a Notice of Investigation to Respondent, requesting a response within
fifteen (15) days. When no response was received, Respondent was served with a
letter pursuant to In the Matter of Treacy, 277 S.C. 514, 290 S.E.2d 240 (1982),
again requesting Respondent's response. Respondent's written response was 
received on July 14, 2014.   
Matter F
While administratively suspended, Respondent agreed to represent Client F on a 
probate matter. Client F paid Respondent $600. Respondent did not perform any 
legal services for Client F and converted the money paid by Client F for 
Respondent's personal use. ODC mailed a Notice of Investigation to Respondent 
on March 12, 2014, requesting a response within fifteen (15) days. When no 
response was received, Respondent was served with a letter pursuant to In the 
Matter of Treacy, 277 S.C. 514, 290 S.E.2d 240 (1982), again requesting 
Respondent's response. Respondent's written response was received on July 14, 
2014. 
Matter G
Respondent accepted $750 to complete a will for Client G after his license was
administratively suspended.  Respondent did not complete the will for Client G and 
failed to adequately communicate with Client G. Respondent later reimbursed 
Client G the amount of $750.
ODC mailed Respondent a Notice of Investigation on March 12, 2014, requesting 
a response within fifteen (15) days. When no response was received, Respondent
was served with a letter pursuant to In the Matter of Treacy, 277 S.C. 514, 290 
S.E.2d 240 (1982), again requesting Respondent's response. Respondent's written 
response was received on July 14, 2014.
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Matter H
	
Respondent represented Client H prior to being administratively suspended.  After
Respondent's suspension, Respondent accepted additional fees of approximately 
$6,975 from Client H. Respondent maintains some of the fees were for services 
performed prior to his suspension. However, Respondent acknowledges he also 
accepted fees for work he did not perform. Respondent later reimbursed Client H
$10,000. 
ODC mailed a Notice of Investigation to Respondent on March 12, 2014. When 
no response was received, Respondent was served with a letter pursuant to In the 
Matter of Treacy, 277 S.C. 514, 290 S.E.2d 240 (1982), again requesting 
Respondent's response. Respondent's written response was received on July 14, 
2014. 
Matter I
In September 2012, Client I retained Respondent for representation in a domestic 
matter. Respondent received $350 for the representation. Respondent prepared a 
summons and complaint that was filed on September 13, 2012. A temporary 
hearing was held on October 22, 2012. A final hearing was held on January 31, 
2013. Respondent was administratively suspended prior to the completion of a
final order in the domestic matter. As part of a plea agreement reached in the 
criminal case discussed in Matter R below, Respondent agreed to reimburse Client
I the amount of $350.
ODC mailed a Notice of Investigation to Respondent on March 12, 2014. When 
no response was received, Respondent was served with a letter pursuant to In the 
Matter of Treacy, 277 S.C. 514, 290 S.E.2d 240 (1982), again requesting 
Respondent's response. Respondent's written response was received on July 14, 
2014. 
Matter J 
Client J paid respondent $500 to represent him in a matter involving the South 
Carolina State Guard. At the time Respondent accepted the fee, his license to  
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practice law had been administratively suspended. Respondent did not perform  
any legal services for Client J and converted the $500 paid by Client J for  
Respondent's personal use. Respondent later reimbursed Client J the amount of 
$500. 
ODC mailed a Notice of Investigation to Respondent on March 12, 2014. When 
no response was received, Respondent was served with a letter pursuant to In the 
Matter of Treacy, 277 S.C. 514, 290 S.E.2d 240 (1982), again requesting 
Respondent's response. Respondent's written response was received on July 14, 
2014. 
Matter K
After his administrative suspension, Respondent accepted $1,500 to represent 
Client K in a civil matter. Respondent performed legal services for Client K while 
Respondent was administratively suspended by this Court. Respondent failed to 
adequately communicate with Client K.  Respondent refunded $1,500 to Client K.   
ODC mailed a Notice of Investigation to Respondent on March 12, 2014. When 
no response was received, Respondent was served with a letter pursuant to In the 
Matter of Treacy, 277 S.C. 514, 290 S.E.2d 240 (1982), again requesting 
Respondent's response. Respondent's written response was received on July 14, 
2014. 
Matter L 
Client L retained Respondent prior to Respondent's administrative suspension.
Respondent was paid $1,387.50 by Client L to prepare a deed, wills and durable 
powers of attorney. Respondent continued to work for Client L following his 
suspension. Respondent failed to adequately communicate with Client L regarding 
the status of Client L's matters.   
ODC mailed a Notice of Investigation to Respondent on March 12, 2014. When 
no response was received, Respondent was served with a letter pursuant to In the 
Matter of Treacy, 277 S.C. 514, 290 S.E.2d 240 (1982), again requesting 
Respondent's response. Respondent's written response was received on July 14, 
2014. 
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Matter M
	
On May 10, 2013, Client M's grandfather paid $500 to Respondent to review 
Client M's criminal charges. At that time, Client M was represented by another 
attorney. Respondent made several inquiries about Client M's situation. After 
Respondent was placed on administrative suspension, Responded failed to
adequately communicate with Client M and did not adequately explain the scope 
and extent of his representation. Respondent did not perform any legal work on 
Client M's behalf, and a public defender was appointed to represent Client M.
Respondent did not refund the unused portion of the fee paid to him for the  
representation of Client M. 
ODC mailed a Notice of Investigation to Respondent on March 12, 2014. When 
no response was received, Respondent was served with a letter pursuant to In the 
Matter of Treacy, 277 S.C. 514, 290 S.E.2d 240 (1982), again requesting 
Respondent's response. Respondent's written response was received on July 14, 
2014. 
Matter N 
Client M's mother paid Respondent $5,280 to represent Client M in connection 
with criminal charges. Of the funds received, Respondent paid $800 on behalf of 
Client M for restitution. Respondent admits he received a portion of the funds 
after he was placed on administrative suspension. Respondent failed to adequately
communicate with Client M or Client M's mother. Respondent did not refund the 
unearned portion of the fee paid to him for the representation. Respondent also 
failed to hold the fees in trust until earned. Respondent later reimbursed Client M
the amount of $500.   
ODC mailed a Notice of Investigation to Respondent on July 18, 2014, requesting 
a response within fifteen (15) days. When no response was received, Respondent
was served with a letter pursuant to In the Matter of Treacy, 277 S.C. 514, 290 
S.E.2d 240 (1982), again requesting Respondent's response. Respondent's written 
response was received on October 3, 2014.   
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Matter O
	
Client N paid Respondent $1,500 to complete a qualified domestic relations order 
(QDRO). Respondent failed to complete the QDRO and failed to adequately 
communicate with Client N regarding the matter. After Respondent was 
administratively suspended from the practice of law, he failed to refund the unused 
portion of the fee.  Respondent also failed to hold the fees in trust until earned.   
On July 18, 2014, ODC mailed a Notice of Investigation to Respondent, requesting 
a response within fifteen (15) days. When no response was received, Respondent
was served with a letter pursuant to In the Matter of Treacy, 277 S.C. 514, 290 
S.E.2d 240 (1982), again requesting Respondent's response. Respondent's written 
response was received on October 3, 2014.   
Matter P 
Client P retained Respondent to represent him in a domestic matter. Respondent
quoted Client P a fee of $750 plus costs for the representation, which Client P paid
in installments. Respondent received a portion of the fees and costs after he was
placed on administrative suspension. Respondent failed to do any work in
furtherance of the representation. According to Respondent, he could not begin 
work on the matter until Client P paid the outstanding amount of his child support
obligations. Respondent did not hold the fees and costs in trust and also did not 
refund Client P's fees and costs upon Respondent's suspension. 
On August 4, 2014, ODC mailed a Notice of Investigation to Respondent, 
requesting a response within fifteen (15) days. When no response was received, 
Respondent was served with a letter pursuant to In the Matter of Treacy, 277 S.C. 
514, 290 S.E.2d 240 (1982), again requesting Respondent's response.  
Respondent's written response was received on October 3, 2014. 
Matter Q
Client P paid Respondent $1,500 to complete guardianship paperwork for Client 
P's relative. At the time Respondent received the funds, he was employed by a law 
firm. Respondent left the law firm before completing the guardianship paperwork.
Respondent did not deposit the funds paid by Client P in the firm's trust account 
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and did not refund any portion of the fee to Client P. Respondent failed to notify 
Client P when he left the law firm, and he failed to adequately communicate with 
Client P regarding the status of the guardianship. Another attorney in the firm 
continued the work on Client P's behalf without additional compensation.   
Matter R
On June 13, 2016, Respondent pled of guilty to one count of Unauthorized Practice
of Law. Respondent was sentenced to five years and a $5,000 fine, suspended on 
service of five years' probation and payment of restitution. The order further  
provided probation could be terminated after no less than thirty months if 
Respondent paid all ordered restitution. According to the Attorney General's
office, the plea resolved claims of Unauthorized Practice of Law and Breach of 
Trust for Clients B, F, G, H, I, J, K, L and M, above. 
Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct
Respondent admits he violated the following provisions of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR: Rule 1.3 (a lawyer shall act with 
reasonable diligence in representing a client); Rule 1.4 (a lawyer shall keep his or 
her client reasonably informed and comply with reasonable requests for 
information); Rule 1.5 (a lawyer must refund the unearned portion of a fee upon 
termination); Rule 1.15(c) (a lawyer shall deposit into a client trust account 
unearned legal fees and expenses that have been paid in advance, to be withdrawn 
by the lawyer only as fees are earned or expenses incurred); Rule 1.15(d) (upon 
receiving funds in which a client has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the 
client and shall promptly deliver to the client any funds the client is entitled to
receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall promptly render a full
accounting regarding such property); Rule 1.16(a) (a lawyer shall withdraw from 
representation of a client if the representation will result in violation of the Rules 
of Professional Conduct or other law); Rule 1.16(d) (upon termination of 
representation, a lawyer must return the unearned fee to the client); Rule 3.2 (a
lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the 
interests of the client); Rule 5.5(a) (a lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction 
in violation of any regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction); Rule 
8.1(b) (a lawyer shall not knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for 
information from a disciplinary authority in a disciplinary matter); Rule 8.4(a) (it is
professional misconduct for a lawyer to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct); 
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Rule 8.4(b) (it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to commit a criminal act 
that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a 
lawyer); Rule 8.4(d) (it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation); and Rule 8.4(e) 
(it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct that is prejudicial 
to the administration of justice).   
Conclusion 
 
We accept the Agreement for Discipline by Consent and disbar Respondent from 
the practice of law in this state, retroactive to March 5, 2014, the date of his interim 
suspension. In addition, we impose the following conditions:   
 
1. within thirty (30) days of the date of this opinion, Respondent shall pay the 
costs incurred in the investigation and prosecution of this matter by ODC 
and the Commission on Lawyer Conduct (the Commission); 
 
2. Respondent 	shall complete the South Carolina Bar's Legal Ethics and   
Practice Program Ethics School and Trust Account School prior to seeking 
readmission; 
 
3. within sixty days of the date of this opinion, Respondent shall enter into a 
restitution agreement with the Commission for the payment of restitution in 
the following amounts to the following clients, reduced by any payment 
made by the Lawyer's Fund for Client Protection (Lawyers' Fund) to or on 
behalf of the client, and shall repay the Lawyers' Fund for any payments it 
has made to Respondent's former clients on Respondent's behalf: 
 
(a) $1,000 to Client A; 
 
(b) $7,000 to Client C; 
 
(c) $300 to Client D;  
 
(d) $3,980 to Client M; 
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(e) $1,500 to Client N; and 
 
(f) $750 to Client P.   
 
4. Respondent shall comply with the terms of the June 13, 2016 Order of 
Restitution issued by the Court of General Sessions.   
 
Within fifteen (15) days of the date of this opinion, Respondent shall file an 
affidavit with the Clerk of Court showing that he has complied with Rule   30 of   
Rule 413, SCACR, and shall also surrender his Certificate of Admission to the 
Practice of Law to the Clerk of Court. 
 
DISBARRED. 

 
PLEICONES, C.J., BEATTY, KITTREDGE, HEARN and FEW, JJ., concur.
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

The State, Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
Stephen Douglas Berry, Petitioner. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2015-002580 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Appeal From Union County 

The Honorable John C. Hayes, III, Circuit Court Judge  

Opinion No. 27690 

Submitted November 17, 2016 – Filed December 7, 2016 

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED 
League B. Creech, of Peters, Murdaugh, Parker, Eltzroth 
& Detrick, P.A., of Hampton, and Chief Appellate 
Defender Robert Michael Dudek, of Columbia, for 
Petitioner. 
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant 
Attorney General William M. Blitch, Jr., both of 
Columbia, for Respondent. 
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[PER CURIAM]: Petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari to review the Court of 
Appeals' decision in State v. Berry, 413 S.C. 118, 775 S.E.2d 51 (Ct. App. 2015).  
We grant the petition, dispense with further briefing, and affirm the Court of 
Appeals' decision as modified.   
Petitioner was convicted of criminal sexual conduct with a minor, second degree.  
At trial, the State called Kim Roseborough (Roseborough) who was qualified as an 
expert in the field of "child sexual abuse assessment and treatment."  The relevant 
section of Roseborough's testimony consisted of three distinct parts: (1) testimony 
regarding the victim's demeanor witnessed by Roseborough during therapy; (2) 
testimony explaining and discussing delayed disclosure as part of the Child Sexual 
Abuse Accommodation Syndrome; and (3) testimony addressing trauma associated
with sexual abuse and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).   
During the first portion of Roseborough's testimony, the State asked, "Were the 
circumstances of [the victim's] disclosure . . . consistent with the disclosure of 
sexual abuse?" Trial counsel objected, citing State v. Kromah, 401 S.C. 340, 737 
S.E.2d 490 (2013) as grounds for the objection.  The trial judge sustained the 
objection, finding such a question solicited Roseborough's opinion on whether the 
victim was telling the truth. 
During the second portion of her testimony, Roseborough explained why victims 
of child sexual abuse often choose to delay disclosing abuse.  The State asked if 
any factors were present in the victim's case which might have led to her delaying 
disclosure of the alleged abuse.  The trial court sustained trial counsel's objection 
to this question.1  The solicitor continued to try and ask, in many different ways, 
what factors of delayed disclosure were demonstrated by the victim.  Trial counsel 
continued to object, without stating his grounds, and these objections were all 
sustained. At no point during the first two portions of Roseborough's testimony 
did trial counsel move for a mistrial, curative instructions, or to strike the 
testimony solicited immediately prior to a sustained objection.
Finally, the State introduced the third part of Roseborough's testimony discussing 
the trauma associated with sexual abuse and possible PTSD resulting from that 
trauma. The solicitor asked Roseborough about the typical symptoms of trauma
1 The jury was excused so that the attorneys could argue this objection.  The record on appeal is 
missing five pages containing a majority of this discussion, therefore, only part of the 
conversation was available for review by this Court. 
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exhibited by a child who suffered sexual assault.  Roseborough's answer discussed 
symptoms of trauma, including PTSD.  Trial counsel objected and approached the 
bench for an off the record conference.  After the conference, neither the grounds 
for the objection nor the trial judge's ruling were placed on the record, and
Roseborough continued to testify about trauma and PTSD.  Specifically, 
Roseborough testified to the trauma symptoms a child would tend to show after
being sexually abused and began to explain the trauma symptoms she observed in 
the victim.  After discussing three such symptoms demonstrated by the victim, trial 
counsel objected, but the objection was overruled.  Roseborough went on to 
explain that she referred the victim to a psychiatrist because she exhibited many of 
the criteria for diagnosing PTSD listed in the Diagnostic Statistical Manual and, 
that in her opinion, the victim suffered from PTSD. 
After the State concluded its case-in-chief, trial counsel placed the objection, 
discussed at sidebar during the third portion of Roseborough's testimony, on the 
record. Trial counsel argued there was no evidence of Roseborough's 
qualifications to diagnose PTSD; specifically, trial counsel asserted Roseborough 
was qualified as a social worker and not a medical doctor.  The trial judge 
reiterated his sidebar determination that you do not need to be a medical doctor to 
diagnosis PTSD. 
The Court of Appeals found the issue of whether Roseborough's testimony 
regarding trauma symptoms and PTSD violated the directives established in 
Kromah preserved for appeal. In coming to this conclusion, the Court of Appeals 
found the specific grounds for petitioner's objection to questions regarding trauma
symptoms and PTSD were apparent from the context given his objections to the 
first two portions of Roseborough's testimony.  On the merits, the Court of Appeals 
found the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Roseborough to testify 
regarding behaviors she observed in the victim and the symptoms of PTSD. 
However, we find any issues regarding Roseborough's testimony, other than her 
discussion of symptoms of trauma associated with sexual assault and PTSD, are 
not preserved for review because petitioner's objections were sustained and trial 
counsel did not take any further measures to have the testimony stricken from the 
record, curative instructions given, or a mistrial granted.  See State v. Wilson, 389 
S.C. 579, 698 S.E.2d 862 (Ct. App. 2010) ("Appellate courts have recognized that 
an issue will not be preserved for review where the trial court sustains a party's 
objection to improper testimony and the party does not subsequently move to strike 
the testimony or for a mistrial," because "without a motion to strike or motion for a 
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mistrial, when the objecting party is sustained, he has received what he asked for 
and cannot be heard to complain about a favorable ruling on appeal."); see also
State v. Byers, 392 S.C. 438, 710 S.E.2d 55 (2011) ("When a witness answers a
question before an objection is made, the objecting party must make a motion to
strike the answer to preserve the issue of the statement's admissibility."). 
Additionally, to the extent petitioner asserts error in Roseborough's testimony 
regarding symptoms of trauma and PTSD, the record clearly shows that the only 
objection made to that portion of Roseborough's testimony was based upon her 
qualifications to diagnose PTSD.  As such, petitioner's current arguments regarding 
that portion of Roseborough's testimony were not properly before the Court of 
Appeals, should not have been ruled upon, and are not properly before this Court.  
See State v. Jennings, 394 S.C. 473, 716 S.E.2d 91 (2011) (noting for an issue to be
properly preserved, it has to be raised to and ruled upon by the trial court); State v. 
Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 587 S.E.2d 691 (2003) (holding a party may not argue one 
ground at trial and another ground on appeal).  
Accordingly, we vacate the Court of Appeals' analysis, but affirm on the grounds 
set forth above. 
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED
PLEICONES, C.J., BEATTY, KITTREDGE, HEARN and FEW, JJ., concur.
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina 
In the Matter of J.M. Long, III, Respondent. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2016-002354 
ORDER 
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel asks this Court to place respondent on interim 
suspension pursuant to Rule 17 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement 
(RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules 
(SCACR). 
 
IT IS ORDERED that respondent's license to practice law in this state is suspended 
until further order of this Court. 
 
Respondent is hereby enjoined from taking any action regarding any trust, escrow, 
operating, and any other law office account(s) respondent may maintain at any 
bank or other financial institution, including, but not limited to, making any 
withdrawal or transfer, or writing any check or other instrument on the account(s).   
 
 
s/ Costa M. Pleicones  C.J. 
 
 
 
 
Columbia, South Carolina 
December 1, 2016 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

William Lee Turner, Employee, Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
SAIIA Construction, Employer, and Old Republic 
General Insurance Corporation c/o Gallagher Bassett 
Services, Inc., Carrier, Respondents. 
  
Appellate Case No. 2014-002416 
Appeal From The Workers' Compensation Commission 
Opinion No. 5458 

Heard June 9, 2016 – Filed December 7, 2016 

AFFIRMED 
Preston F. McDaniel, of McDaniel Law Firm, of 
Columbia, for Appellant. 
Jason Wendell Lockhart and Helen Faith Hiser, both of 
McAngus Goudelock & Courie, LLC, of Mount Pleasant, 
for Respondents. 
LOCKEMY, C.J.: William Lee Turner appeals the Appellate Panel of the South 
Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission's (the Commission) decision and 
order denying him benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act (the Act).  
Turner argues the Commission erred in: (1) failing to apply the presumption that 
his injury arose out of and in the course of employment; (2) affirming the single 
commissioner's findings of fact; (3) finding he did not establish a cause for his 
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accidental injury; and (4) allowing Respondents1 to draft the Commission's order. 
We affirm.   
FACTS 
Turner began working for SAIIA Construction Company as a heavy equipment 
operator in 2007. Turner's alleged accident occurred on April 19, 2012, when his 
co-workers found him lying on his back next to his dump truck. Turner testified he 
had no memory of the accident or how it happened.  Paul Barnette and David 
Bolden, Turner's co-workers, testified they never saw Turner in or on the truck 
prior to his fall. However, Turner testified both of his co-workers saw him "up in 
the truck" at some point before he fell.  
Barnette testified that at the end of the work day Turner washed his truck, which 
was typically done with a high pressure washer.  Turner then went into a building 
adjacent to the wash area to do some paperwork and retrieve his backpack and 
Barnette's cooler. After Turner left the building, Bolden exited a trailer called "the 
hut" and walked over to Barnette.  They were talking for some time when they 
noticed Turner lying on his back next to the cab of his truck. Barnette and Bolden 
found Turner lying on his back on the ground with his arms outstretched and his 
palms up.  Although Barnette could not say for certain how long Turner was lying 
on the ground before they saw him, he estimated it would not have been more than 
three or four minutes.  Barnette's cooler and Turner's backpack were found lying 
on the seat of the truck and the truck's door was still open.  Bolden testified, "I 
never saw [Turner] on the steps of the truck," but only "standing on the ground, 
placing the [cooler] on the truck, I did not see him on the steps."   
Turner was taken to Palmetto Health Richland, where he was provided emergency 
treatment and admitted.  Turner was diagnosed with a small subdural hemorrhage, 
intraparenchymal contusion left lobe, and an endplate compression deformity of T3 
and T4. His discharge diagnosis included a small subdural hemorrhage and T3 to 
T4 endplate fractures; however, CT scans showed Turner did not fracture his skull.   
At a follow-up appointment, Dr. James Selph noted Turner, "has a history of back 
pain and in fact was taking Ultram prior to his fall."  All of Turner's remaining 
follow-up treatment was with Dr. Peterson, his family doctor.  
1 SAIIA Construction Company and Old Republic General Insurance Corp., c/o 
Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc., are the Respondents in this matter (collectively, 
Respondents). 
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On March 27, 2012, a few weeks before his accident, Turner sought medical care 
for his lower back, which he injured lifting logs while working on a house he was 
building. He was prescribed Ultram 50MG two times daily and Flexeril 5MG two 
times daily. On April 16, 2012, three days before his accident, Turner sought 
medical care again complaining of both lower and upper back pain.  Turner was 
then prescribed Ultram 100MG two times daily and Neurontin 300MG three times 
daily. On April 17, 2012, two days before his accident, Turner was seen at 
Palmetto Health Baptist Emergency Department with complaints of vomiting, 
diarrhea, and suspicion of dehydration.  James Speegle, Turner's supervisor at the 
time of the injury, testified Turner was complaining about not feeling well a couple 
days before his fall. Speegle recommended Turner take a few days off.   
Turner filed a Form 50 on November 25, 2013, alleging he suffered a compensable 
injury to his back, head, and thoracic spine.  Respondents filed a Form 51, denying 
Turner's injuries were the result of an accident that arose out of and in the course 
and scope of employment.  The parties were heard by the single commissioner on 
February 4, 2014. In an April 14, 2014 order, the single commissioner found 
"[Turner] failed to carry his burden of proving that he sustained a compensable 
injury by accident within the course and scope of his employment with the 
[Respondents] on April 19, 2012."  The single commissioner also found Turner's 
alleged accident was unwitnessed and that he did not remember anything that 
happened on April 19, 2012, or the day after, and that co-workers found Turner 
lying on his back next to his truck.  The single commissioner further found Turner 
was impeached at least twice.  The single commissioner concluded Turner failed to
meet his burden of proving a compensable injury and denied any benefits or 
medical treatment associated with his alleged accident.   
Turner filed a Form 30 raising eleven points of appeal.  Following oral arguments, 
the Commission issued its decision on October 10, 2014, affirming the single 
commissioner's order in its entirety.  In addition, the Commission set forth its 
standard of review, and responded to Turner's reliance on prior case law.  Turner 
relied on Packer v. Corbett Canning Co., 238 S.C. 431, 120 S.E.2d 398 (1961) and 
Owens v. Ocean Forest Club, 196 S.C. 97, 12 S.E.2d 839 (1941), to establish he 
suffered from a compensable work related accident due to the unexplained death or 
injury presumption.  The Commission found that because Turner was found on the 
ground and could not remember or testify as to how he fell, and there were no 
witnesses to the accident, the presumption could not be applied to establish the 
accident arose out of his employment.  The Commission held Turner failed to meet 
his burden of proving a compensable injury by accident within the course and 
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scope of his employment and denied him any benefits under the Act.  This appeal 
followed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal from an appellate panel of the Workers' Compensation Commission, 
this court can reverse or modify the decision if it is affected by an error of law or is 
clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the 
whole record. Pierre v. Seaside Farms, Inc., 386 S.C. 534, 540, 689 S.E.2d 615, 
618 (2010). "The claimant has the burden of proving facts that will bring the 
injury within the workers' compensation law, and such award must not be based on 
surmise, conjecture or speculation."  Crisp v. SouthCo., 401 S.C. 627, 641, 738 
S.E.2d 835, 842 (2013). In a workers' compensation case, the appellate panel is the 
ultimate fact-finder.  Pratt v. Morris Roofing, Inc., 357 S.C. 619, 622, 594 S.E.2d 
272, 273 (2004). However, when there are no disputed facts, the question of 
whether an accident is compensable is a question of law.  Grant v. Grant Textiles, 
372 S.C. 196, 201, 641 S.E.2d 869, 872 (2007).  "[W]orkers' compensation law is 
to be liberally construed in favor of coverage in order to serve the beneficent 
purpose of the [Workers' Compensation] Act; only exceptions and restrictions on 
coverage are to be strictly construed."  James v. Anne's Inc., 390 S.C. 188, 198, 
701 S.E.2d 730, 735 (2010). 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
I. Presumption 
Turner argues the Commission erred as a matter of law by failing to apply the 
unexplained death presumption.  We disagree. 
For an accidental injury to be compensable, it must "aris[e] out of and in the course 
of employment."  S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-160(A) (2015).  An injury arises out of 
employment if it is proximately caused by the employment.  Douglas v. Spartan 
Mills, Startex Div., 245 S.C. 265, 269, 140 S.E.2d 173, 175 (1965).   
The unexplained death presumption is   
a natural presumption, or a presumption of fact, that one 
charged with the performance of a duty and injured while 
performing such duty, or found injured where his duty 
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required him to be, is injured in the course of, and as a 
consequence of, his employment. 
Jennings v. Chambers Dev. Co., 335 S.C. 249, 255-56, 516 S.E.2d 453, 456-57 
(Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Packer, 238 S.C. at 436, 120 S.E.2d at 400). "The 
presumption is applied simply to establish that the injury occurred in the course of 
and as a consequence of employment.  The presumption cannot be applied to 
establish the incident of accident." Id.
We disagree with Turner's assertion that the unexplained death presumption should 
apply in cases where the employee survives the injury but has no memory of the 
events leading up to the injury.  Turner failed to cite any South Carolina case law 
extending the presumption, heretofore applied only in death cases, to cases where 
the employee survives but has no memory of the injury.  In addition, we note other 
states, including North Carolina, have limited the presumption to cases where the 
employee is deceased and have refused to apply it where the employee is alive but 
has no memory of the injury.  See Janney v. J.W. Jones Lumber Co., 550 S.E.2d 
543, 546 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (declining to adopt the unexplained death 
presumption in a workers' compensation case not resulting in death).  "Because 
South Carolina workers' compensation law is fashioned after North Carolina's 
statute, our courts often rely on North Carolina precedent for guidance in 
interpreting the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Act."  Hernandez-Zuniga 
v. Tickle, 374 S.C. 235, 248-49, 647 S.E.2d 691, 698 (Ct. App. 2007).  
We particularly find persuasive the North Carolina Court of Appeals' reasoning in 
declining to extend the presumption beyond those cases which result in death.  
With facts very similar to the instant case, a lumber grader in Janney was waiting 
on a board to grade and soon found himself lying on the grading booth floor with 
an injury to his head. Id. at 545. The employee testified that, when he regained 
consciousness, he had no memory of hitting his head on the grading console or the 
floor. Id.  In awarding benefits, the workers' compensation commission found the 
employee was entitled to the unexplained death presumption of compensability.  
Id. at 546. 
On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the commission's 
application of the unexplained death presumption in the case.  Id.  The court 
explained the underlying purpose of the presumption is fairness because 
employers, rather than a decedent's family, are in a better position to offer evidence 
surrounding the employee's death.  Id.  Employers and their employees are often 
the last to see the decedent alive, the first to discover the body, and are familiar 
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with the decedent's work duties.  Id. In a case of an unexplained injury where the 
claimant survives but has no memory of the injury's details, however, no 
"inequality of information" exists because the employer does not know any more 
about the circumstances of the claimant's injury than did the claimant himself.  Id. 
Even if we were to extend the presumption in the present case, we find the 
employer presented sufficient evidence that Turner had very recent, non-work- 
related preexisting back conditions and rebutted such presumption.  Upon our 
review of the Commission's final order, we believe the Commission weighed this 
competent evidence in its finding that Turner's alleged injury to his back at the job 
site did not arise out of his employment.  Therefore, we affirm on this issue. 
II. Findings of Fact 
Turner argues the Commission erred in affirming the following findings of fact 
made by the single commissioner: (1) Turner suffered a work related accident on 
April 19, 2012; (2) Turner's age; (3) Turner is a high school graduate; (4) Turner 
remembered nothing about the day before the accident, the day of the accident, and 
the day after the accident; (5) the alleged accident was unwitnessed; and (6) no 
witnesses claimed to have seen Turner's alleged accident.  Initially, we note that 
under our standard of review, this court cannot weigh the evidence on questions of 
fact because the Commission is the ultimate fact finder.  Furthermore, we find 
Turner's argument is without merit because the findings of fact are all supported by 
substantial evidence in the record.  Thus, we hold the Commission did not err in 
affirming the single commissioner's findings of fact.  See Matute v. Palmetto 
Health Baptist, 391 S.C. 291, 294, 705 S.E.2d 472, 474 (Ct. App. 2011) ("When
reviewing an appeal from the Workers' Compensation Commission, this court may 
not weigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the [Commission] as 
to the weight of evidence on questions of fact.").  
III. Arising Out of Employment 
Turner argues the Commission erred in finding he failed to meet his burden of 
proving he suffered a compensable injury by accident within the course and scope 
of his employment.  We disagree. 
For an accidental injury to be compensable, it must "aris[e] out of and in the course 
of employment."  S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-160(A) (2015).  "'Arising out of' refers to 
the injury's origin and cause, whereas 'in the course of' refers to the injury's time, 
place, and circumstances."  Osteen v. Greenville Cty. Sch. Dist., 333 S.C. 43, 50, 
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508 S.E.2d 21, 24 (1998). For an injury to arise out of employment, there must be 
"a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be 
performed and the resulting injury."  Grant, 372 S.C. at 201, 641 S.E.2d at 871. 
An unexplained fall is generally not compensable unless the employment 
contributed to either the cause or the effect of the fall.  Bagwell v. Ernest Burwell, 
Inc., 227 S.C. 444, 452-53, 88 S.E.2d 611, 614-15 (1955).  The causative danger 
"need not have been foreseen or expected, but after the event it must appear to 
have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment, and to have flowed 
from that source as a rational consequence."  West v. All. Capital, 368 S.C. 246, 
252, 628 S.E.2d 279, 282 (Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Douglas, 245 S.C. at 269, 140 
S.E.2d at 175). "The burden is on the claimant to prove such facts as will render 
the injury compensable, and such an award must not be based on surmise, 
conjecture or speculation." Crosby v. Wal-Mart Store, Inc., 330 S.C. 489, 496, 499 
S.E.2d 253, 257 (Ct. App. 1998). "A liberal construction of the evidence cannot be 
substituted for failure of proof of any essential element of the claim; and the 
preponderance of evidence rule has been held not to require, as a matter of law, 
that doubts arising from the evidence be resolved in favor of one party or the 
other." Cross v. Concrete Materials, 236 S.C. 440, 446-47, 114 S.E.2d 828, 832 
(1960) (quoting 100 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 547(7), pp. 602, 603).
In Crosby, a Wal-Mart employee sought benefits for injuries she sustained when 
she fell at work. 330 S.C. at 490, 499 S.E.2d at 254.  The claimant testified she fell 
while walking through the store on the way to a meeting.  Id.  She stated, "I was 
just walking on the floor and my feet went from under me."  Id.  This court 
determined the claimant's fall was an unexplained fall.  We stated, "there was no 
evidence offered in the case at hand as to what caused [the claimant] to fall.  It 
would be wholly conjectural to say under the evidence presented that [the
claimant's] employment was a contributing cause of her injury." Id. at 495, 499 
S.E.2d at 256. This court further reasoned that, while the fall was unexplained, 
there was an apparent lack of work connection and an implication of a pre-existing 
physical condition.  Id. at 496, 499 S.E.2d at 257. This court concluded there was 
substantial evidence to support the Commission's finding that claimant failed to 
show a causal connection between her fall and her employment.  Id.
In Barnes v. Charter 1 Realty, 411 S.C. 391, 398, 768 S.E.2d 651, 654 (2015), our 
supreme court found a causal connection between the claimant's injury and 
employment where the claimant was performing a work-related task (walking to 
check another employee's email) when she tripped and fell.  The court held the 
claimant "clearly established that she was performing her job when she sustained 
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an accidental injury." Id. at 399, 768 S.E.2d at 655. In a dissenting opinion, 
Justice Pleicones asserted "[w]here the claimant presents no evidence as to what 
caused the fall, it is wholly conjectural to say that 'employment was a contributing 
cause of [claimant's] injury.'" Id. at 400, 768 S.E.2d at 655. Further, because 
claimant failed to present evidence that her employment caused her fall, she failed 
to meet the "arises out of employment" component required to prove a 
compensable injury.  Id. Justice Pleicones noted South Carolina denies 
compensation for unexplained falls, and absent special conditions or 
circumstances, a level floor cannot cause an accident.  Id.
In Nicholson v. South Carolina Department of Social Services, 411 S.C. 381, 383, 
390, 769 S.E.2d 1, 2 (2015), the claimant was walking down a hallway to a work-
related meeting when she scuffed her foot on the carpet and fell. The supreme 
court found: 
Nicholson was at work on the way to a meeting when she 
tripped and fell. The circumstances of her employment 
required her to walk down the hallway to perform her 
responsibilities and in the course of those duties she 
sustained an injury. We hold these facts establish a 
causal connection between her employment and her 
injuries—the law requires nothing more.  Because 
Nicholson's fall happened at work and was not caused by 
a condition peculiar to her, it was causally connected to 
her employment.  Therefore, her injuries arose out of her 
employment as a matter of law and she is entitled to 
workers' compensation. 
Id. at 390, 769 S.E.2d at 5-6. In a concurring opinion, Justice Pleicones stated the 
majority erred in absolving the petitioner of her obligation to present evidence that 
her unexplained fall was the result of special conditions or circumstances.  Id. at
391, 769 S.E.2d at 6. He concluded it is not enough that a claimant show that she 
fell while at work but rather, when the fall occurs on a level surface, that she 
present evidence to explain her fall. Id. 
We hold substantial evidence supports the Commission's finding that Turner failed 
to establish a causal connection between his unexplained fall and his employment.  
See Bagwell, 227 S.C. at 452-53, 88 S.E.2d at 614-15 (stating that an unexplained 
fall is generally not compensable unless the employment contributed to either the 
cause or the effect of the fall).
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Turner was found lying on his back next to his truck; however, he had no 
recollection of the event and could not describe the circumstances regarding the 
fall. Turner's co-workers testified they did not see him fall, and only found him
after he was lying on the ground.  Further, despite Turner testifying his co-workers 
saw him on the steps of his truck, Bolden testified he never saw Turner on the steps 
and only found him on the ground after a few minutes.  Here, unlike in Barnes and
Nicholson, we cannot determine what Turner was doing at the time of his alleged 
accident. Although Turner was at work when he fell, no evidence indicates his 
employment contributed to the cause of his fall.  As set forth above, the burden is 
on Turner to establish facts showing his injury is compensable. See Crosby, 330 
S.C. at 496, 499 S.E.2d at 257 ("The burden is on the claimant to prove such facts 
as will render the injury compensable, and such an award must not be based on 
surmise, conjecture or speculation.").  Accordingly, the Commission did not err in 
finding Turner failed to meet his burden of proving he suffered a compensable 
injury by accident within the course and scope of his employment.   
IV. Drafting the Order 
Turner argues the Commission erred in allowing Respondents to draft their own 
findings of fact and conclusions of law addressing the issues raised for review.  We 
disagree. 
In a letter to all counsel, the Commission stated, "This document is not an Order.  
It is a request for a proposed Order.  The undersigned reserves the right to modify 
or delete any portion of this document." The letter goes on to include instructions 
stating: 
[Respondents] to prepare proposed Order unless 
otherwise agreed upon by the parties.  Proposed Order 
shall include VERBATIM Findings of Fact attached 
hereto, unless there is a mistake, in which case, it may 
be corrected.  ATTORNEYS ARE RESPONSIBLE 
FOR PROOFING ORDERS PRIOR TO 
SUBMISSION. Any other Findings of Fact not 
inconsistent with those attached hereto may also be 
included. 
Here, the Commission asked Respondents to prepare a proposed order and 
reserved the right to modify and/or delete any portion before signing the order.  
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Therefore, Turner's argument is without merit.  See Brown v. Peoplease Corp., 402 
S.C. 476, 486, 741 S.E.2d 761, 766 (Ct. App. 2013) (holding the Commission is 
not in error when it asks a party to prepare a proposed order reciting the specific 
findings of fact and rulings of law on the single commissioner's order, and the 
Commission reserves the right to modify and/or delete any or all portions of the 
submitted order).
CONCLUSION 
We affirm the Commission's denial of compensation. 
AFFIRMED.  
WILLIAMS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur. 
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WILLIAMS, J.:  Susan B. Thompson appeals the family court's order finding the 
existence of a common law marriage between her and A. Marion Stone, III.  We 
dismiss.  
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FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Stone filed a complaint in the family court alleging the existence of a common law 
marriage with Thompson.  In the complaint, Stone sought a divorce, equitable 
apportionment of the putative marital estate, attorney's fees and costs, and other 
relief. Thompson answered and filed a motion to bifurcate the case to first 
determine whether a common law marriage existed before deciding issues of 
divorce and equitable division.  The family court subsequently granted Thompson's 
motion, and over the course of eight days, the court conducted a trial regarding the 
existence of a common law marriage.   
At the conclusion of the first phase of the trial, the family court issued an order 
finding a common law marriage and awarding Stone attorney's fees.  The family 
court also ordered each party to immediately schedule the final hearing on the 
remaining issues with the county clerk of court.  Thereafter, Thompson appealed 
the family court's order.1 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
Thompson argues the family court's order on the issue of common law marriage is 
immediately appealable because the order is a final judgment, involves the merits, 
and affects a substantial right determining the mode of trial.2  We address each 
argument in turn. 
I. Final Judgment 
Thompson first contends the family court's order is a final judgment pursuant to 
section 14-3-330(1) of the South Carolina Code (1976).  We disagree.  
Generally, only final judgments are appealable.  See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-3-
630(A) (2010) ("Any appeal from an order, judgment, or decree of the family court 
shall be taken in the manner provided by the South Carolina Appellate Court 
1 Stone filed a motion in this court to dismiss the appeal.  The court denied the 
motion, but stated in the order that its decision did not preclude Stone from arguing 
the issue when the case was assigned to a panel. 
2 Because Thompson did not address appealability in her final brief, choosing 
instead to reassert the arguments made in her return to Stone's motion to dismiss, 
we reference her return in this opinion. 
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 Rules. The right to appeal must be governed by the same rules, practices, and 
procedures that govern appeals from the circuit court."); § 14-3-330(1) (stating "if 
no appeal [is] taken until final judgment is entered[,] the court may[,] upon appeal 
from such final judgment[,] review any intermediate order or decree necessarily 
affecting the judgment not before appealed from"); Rule 72, SCRCP ("Appeal may 
be taken, as provided by law, from any final judgment or appealable order."); Rule 
201(a), SCACR ("Appeal may be taken, as provided by law, from any final 
judgment, appealable order[,] or decision."). 
In the instant case, we find the family court's order is interlocutory.  While the 
family court ruled that a common law marriage existed between Thompson and 
Stone, it has yet to decide the issues of divorce and equitable distribution.  See 
Mid-State Distribs., Inc. v. Century Imps., Inc., 310 S.C. 330, 335, 426 S.E.2d 777, 
780 (1993) (stating an order is interlocutory if some further act must be done by 
the court prior to the determination of the rights of the parties).  Further, we do not 
believe the family court intended its decision on the common law marriage issue to 
be dispositive of the case as the family court included a handwritten notation on its 
Form 4F order stating that divorce and equitable distribution were "still pending."  
Additionally, the family court explicitly indicated on the Form 4F order that its 
order, although marked "Final," did not end the case.  Thus, we find the order is 
not a final judgment.   
II. Section 14-3-330 
In the alternative, Thompson argues the family court's order is an immediately 
appealable interlocutory order under section 14-3-330 of the South Carolina Code 
(1976 & Supp. 2015). We disagree. 
Absent a specialized statute, an interlocutory order must fall within one of several 
exceptions to the final judgment rule found in section 14-3-330 to be immediately 
appealable. Hagood v. Sommerville, 362 S.C. 191, 195, 607 S.E.2d 707, 708 
(2005). Section 14-3-330 states, in pertinent part, the following:  
The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction for 
correction of errors of law in law cases, and shall review 
upon appeal: 
 
(1) Any intermediate judgment, order[,] or decree in a 
law case involving the merits in actions commenced 
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 in the court of common pleas and general sessions, 
brought there by original process or removed there 
from any inferior court or jurisdiction, and final 
judgments in such actions; provided, that if no appeal 
be taken until final judgment is entered[,] the court 
may[,] upon appeal from such final judgment[,] 
review any intermediate order or decree necessarily 
affecting the judgment not before appealed from; 
 
(2) An order affecting a substantial right made in an 
action when such order (a) in effect determines the 
action and prevents a judgment from which an appeal 
might be taken or discontinues the action, (b) grants 
or refuses a new trial or (c) strikes out an answer or 
any part thereof or any pleading in any action[.] 
S.C. Code Ann. § 14-3-330(1), (2) (1976). 
In keeping with precedent, we narrowly construe section 14-3-330 because 
immediate appeals of various orders generally have not been allowed.  Hagood, 
362 S.C. at 196, 607 S.E.2d at 709.  Indeed, our supreme court has cautioned that 
"[p]iecemeal appeals should be avoided and most errors can be corrected by the 
remedy of a new trial."  Id. 
Thompson first argues the family court's order is an intermediate order "involving 
the merits" of the case under subsection 14-3-330(1) because it finally decided the 
issue of common law marriage between the parties.  We disagree.   
Our supreme court has narrowly defined an order "involving the merits" as an 
order that "must finally determine some substantial matter forming the whole or a 
part of some cause of action or defense."  Mid-State Distribs., Inc., 310 S.C. at 
334, 426 S.E.2d at 780 (quoting Jefferson v. Gene's Used Cars, Inc., 295 S.C. 317, 
318, 368 S.E.2d 456, 456 (1988)). In this case, the issue of common law marriage 
was a preliminary matter for the family court to determine before reaching Stone's 
requests for divorce and division of the marital estate.  The family court merely 
exercised its discretion to bifurcate the trial to save time and resources on the 
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remaining issues if it found that a common law marriage did not exist.3  However, 
the family court was not required to proceed in this fashion and could have 
resolved all the issues raised in Stone's complaint.  At this point, the family court 
has yet to address any of Stone's remaining claims for relief. 
Nonetheless, Thompson claims her "defense" to Stone's divorce action—that a 
common law marriage does not exist—has been finally determined by the family 
court. We find, however, that inherent in any divorce proceeding is an initial 
determination of the existence of a valid marriage, which a party certainly could 
not appeal prior to the adjudication of the other relevant issues before the court.  
To accept Thompson's interpretation would seriously inhibit the efficiency of the 
family court by allowing any party to delay divorce proceedings with an 
interlocutory appeal by contending a valid marriage does not exist.  As our 
supreme court aptly stated, "[E]ndless delays would be encountered—delays which 
are unnecessary in cases similar to the one now before us, which can be decided 
upon an appeal from such final judgment as may later be entered by the trial 
[c]ourt." Good v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 201 S.C. 32, 42, 21 S.E.2d 
209, 213 (1942). Therefore, because the order in this case does not bring the 
litigants to "the end of the road" and requires further action by the family court, we 
find the order is not immediately appealable under subsection 14-3-330(1).  See 
Mid-State Distribs., Inc., 310 S.C. at 334–35, 426 S.E.2d at 780. 
Finally, Thompson contends the family court's order is immediately appealable 
under subsection 14-3-330(2) because it affects her fundamental right to marriage 
and determines the mode of trial.  We disagree.  
"Immediate appeals under subsection (2) have been allowed in situations whe[n] 
the substantial right could not be vindicated on appeal after the case." Breland v. 
Love Chevrolet Olds, Inc., 339 S.C. 89, 93, 529 S.E.2d 11, 13 (2000).  "Generally 
[subsection (2)] has only been used when the trial order affected the 'mode of trial'
because if those orders are not immediately appealed, no appellate review is 
available to correct any error."  Id. When a trial court's order deprives a party of a 
3 The family court has discretion on whether to bifurcate a trial and is encouraged 
to do so when bifurcation helps clarify and simplify the issues.  See Rule 42(b), 
SCRCP ("The court, in furtherance of convenience . . . may order a separate trial of 
any . . . separate issue . . . ."); Durham v. Vinson, 360 S.C. 639, 644–45 n.2, 602 
S.E.2d 760, 762 n.2 (2004) (finding the circuit court has discretion to bifurcate a 
trial). 
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mode of trial to which it is entitled as a matter of right, the order is immediately 
appealable. Flagstar Corp. v. Royal Surplus Lines, 341 S.C. 68, 72, 533 S.E.2d 
331, 333 (2000). 
We first find Thompson conflates the idea of a fundamental constitutional right to 
marry, or not to be married, with a substantial right in a legal proceeding.  In any 
event, the order does not affect a substantial right because Thompson will not be 
prevented from correcting any alleged errors in the family court's interlocutory 
order following final judgment on the remaining issues.  See Breland, 339 S.C. at 
93, 529 S.E.2d at 13; § 14-3-330(1) (providing, "if no appeal [is] taken until final 
judgment is entered[,] the court may[,] upon appeal from such final judgment[,] 
review any intermediate order or decree necessarily affecting the judgment not 
before appealed from"). 
Nevertheless, Thompson also points out that Stone currently has similar claims 
against her in the circuit court that were stayed pending the outcome of the family 
court proceedings.  Thompson claims the interlocutory order deprives her of a 
particular mode of trial because the family court would be divested of subject 
matter jurisdiction if it found a common law marriage did not exist between her 
and Stone. In effect, Thompson argues Stone would be forced to pursue his claims 
in the circuit court where Thompson would be entitled to a jury trial on some or all 
of the causes of action. 
We reject Thompson's overly broad view of subsection 14-3-330(2).  Stone's 
stayed action in the circuit court includes causes of action against Thompson for 
breach of a partnership agreement, breach of fiduciary duty, quantum meruit, 
partition, and constructive trust.  We find the theories of recovery and 
considerations in that case based upon partnership law would be radically different 
from those in the present divorce action grounded in domestic law.  Although a 
dismissal of the family court action certainly may have an effect on whether Stone 
pursues the circuit court action against Thompson, the two actions are completely 
separate. Therefore, the family court's order, which retains subject matter 
jurisdiction over this case, does not deprive Thompson of a mode of trial to which 
she may speculatively be entitled to as a matter of right in another case.  See 
Flagstar Corp., 341 S.C. at 72, 533 S.E.2d at 333 (stating the traditional analysis 
of subsection (2) is whether "a party is erroneously denied a trial by jury in a law 
case, or is erroneously required to proceed before a jury in an equity case"); see 
also, e.g., Woodard v. Westvaco Corp., 319 S.C. 240, 242–43, 243 n.2, 460 S.E.2d 
392, 393–94, 394 n.2 (1995) (holding an order denying a motion to dismiss for 
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lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not immediately appealable because it does 
not fall into one of the enumerated categories of section 14-3-330 and such order 
does not finally determine anything), overruled on other grounds by Sabb v. S.C. 
State Univ., 350 S.C. 416, 422 n.2, 567 S.E.2d 231, 234 n.2 (2002).
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, we find the family court's order is not immediately appealable.  The 
rights of the parties will not be finally determined until the presiding family court 
judge issues a final order on all of the remaining issues, at which time an appeal 
therefrom will be proper.4  Therefore, based on the analysis set forth above, 
Thompson's appeal is 
DISMISSED.5 
THOMAS and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.
4 In her return to Stone's motion to dismiss, Thompson asserts the procedural 
posture of this case is identical to Callen v. Callen, 365 S.C. 618, 620 S.E.2d 59 
(2005), and because our supreme court undoubtedly had subject matter jurisdiction 
in mind when deciding Callen, we are similarly bound to decide this appeal on its 
merits. Contrary to Thompson's assertion, we find this court is not bound by the 
procedural posture of Callen, as there are no facts demonstrating that either party 
or our supreme court, sua sponte, raised the issue of appealability in that case.  See 
Breland, 339 S.C. at 95, 529 S.E.2d at 14 ("The fact that an appellate court may 
have decided an appeal of a particular type of order on the merits is not dispositive 
of whether the order is appealable when the issue of appealability was not raised."). 
5 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR. 
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